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Abstract 
 
A new type of database anomaly is described by 
addressing the concept of Cumulated Anomaly in this 
paper. Dubiety-Determining Model (DDM), which is a 
detection model basing on statistical and fuzzy set 
theories for Cumulated Anomaly, is proposed. DDM 
can measure the dubiety degree of each database 
transaction quantitatively. Software system 
architecture to support the DDM for monitoring 
database transactions is designed. We also 
implemented the system and tested it. Our 
experimental results show that the DDM method is 
feasible and effective.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The number of security-breaking attempts originated 
inside an organization is increasing steadily [5][8]. 
These attacks are usually made by "authorized'' users 
of the system. Typically, in one type of intrusion, an 
attacker who is authorized to modify data records 
under certain constraints deliberately hides his 
intentions to change data beyond constraints in 
different operations and different transactions. Often, 
in this type of attack, each individual transaction is 
legitimate; however, the accumulated results of the 
attacker’s operations are malicious. 
The existing Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) can 
be grouped into two classes: (1) misuse detection, 
which maintains a database of known intrusion 
techniques or behaviors and detects intrusions by 
comparing users’ behaviors against the database [7][8]; 
(2) anomaly detection, which analyzes user behaviors 
and the statistics of a process in a normal situation, and 
checks whether the system is being used in a different 
manner [3][9]. 
In general, misuse detection model cannot detect 
new, unknown intrusions [7]. Anomaly detection needs 
to maintain the records of users' behaviors and the 
statistics for normal usages, which is referred to as 
“profiles”. The profiles tend to be large. That makes 
detecting intrusion needs a large amount of system 
resources, and delays detection decision makings. If 
attackers hide their operations into other places, 
anomaly detection may not even be able to detect them. 
It is fair to say that neither anomaly detection nor 
misuse detection would be able to effectively detect 
Cumulated Anomaly. New techniques need to be 
investigated. 
In this study, we investigate Cumulated Anomaly 
and propose a model for detection. In this model, the 
detection rules are set up manually based on the 
statistical properties of intrusions amongst the normal 
transactions. In addition, membership functions [5] in 
fuzzy set theory, with their parameters specified into 
the detection rules, are applied in the model to monitor 
and present the possibility of intrusions in real time. 
Membership functions assist detection rules to indicate 
the likelihood of a transaction being intrusive. If a 
transaction is identified by a detection rule as a 
“possible” intrusion, it is said that the rule “matches” 
the transaction. An indicator (degree) within the 
interval [ , ]0 1  will be calculated. This indicator is used 
to represent the dubiety degree of a transaction. 
Therefore, this model is named as Dubiety-
Determining Model (DDM). In this method, the 
dubiety of various types of database transactions can 
be quantitatively denoted in a unified form way. By 
showing the dubiety degrees of database transactions, 
the model can detect possible anomalies if their 
dubiety degrees are high. 
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 
reviews some related work briefly. Section 3 describes 
the DDM method. Design and implementation issues 
are discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, the 
experimental results are introduced. Section 6 is the 
conclusion. 
 
2. Related work 
 
The characteristics of widespread used databases 
with the invaluable data held in them make it vital to 
detect any intrusion or intrusion attempts made at the 
databases. Therefore, basing on the development of 
intrusion detections on computer systems, intrusion 
detection for databases is becoming imperative needs. 
Besides access policies, roles, administration 
procedures, physical security, security models, and 
data inference, misuse detection and anomaly detection 
at databases have been focused on. Christina Yip 
Chung, Michael Gertz and Karl Levitt developed 
DEMIDS, which is a misuse detection system for 
database systems tailored to relational database 
systems [2]. Francesco M. Malvestuto, Mauro Mezzini 
and Marina Moscarini propose an approach to avoid 
releasing summary statistics that could lead to the 
disclosure of confidential individual data in [4]. In [8] 
and [10], Sin Yeung Lee, Wai Lup Low and Pei Yuen 
Wong describe an algorithm that summarizes the raw 
transactional SQL queries into compact regular 
expressions. All of them have pointed out that the 
content of transactions can be used to abstract the 
users’ profiles, which will be used during misuse 
detection or anomaly detection. However, to make the 
detection results more precise, some quantitative 
approaches should be employed. 
In the existing database intrusion detection 
researches, fuzzy set theory is mainly used with other 
theories such as neural network in building profiles for 
anomaly detection [1][9][11]. For example, [6] uses a 
fuzzy Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART) and neural 
network to detect anomaly intrusion of database 
operations, by monitoring the connection activities to a 
database. 
As a result, we have a motivation of integrating 
fuzzy set theory and intrusion detection technique to 
deal with Cumulated Anomaly in databases precisely in 
real time. 
 
3. Dubiety-Determining Model (DDM) 
 
Given a metric for a random variable X  and n  
observations 1, , nX X… , the purpose of the statistical 
sub-model of X  is to determine whether a new 
observation 1nX +  is abnormal with respect to the 
previous observations. The mean avg  and the standard 
deviation stdev  of 1, , nX X…  are defined as: 
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A new observation n 1X +  is defined to be abnormal if it 
falls outside a confidence interval that is standard 
deviations from the mean, which is denoted by CI: 
CI avg dev= ±                             (3) 
where dev d stdev= ×  with d  as a parameter. Note 
that 0 (or null) occurrences should be included so as 
not to bias the data. This model can be applied to 
variant cases such as event counters accumulated over 
a fixed time interval. Therefore, it would apply for the 
case of Cumulated Anomaly. 
Membership functions are used to “measure” the 
dubiety degrees for each transaction. For each 
transaction, a value of variable X  can be observed. It 
can be mapped into the interval [ ]0,1  by a membership 
function. We define 0 means completely acceptable, 
and 1 implies anomaly or completely unacceptable. 
The values between 0 and 1 are called dubious degree. 
In this way, the dubiety of transactions can be denoted 
in a unified form. 
An appropriate membership function is the basis of 
quantitative analysis on fuzzy attributes and plays a 
key role in fuzzy mathematics. The most widely used 
functions include S-shaped functions ( SF ), Z-shaped 
functions ( ZF ) and π -shaped functions ( Fπ ). With U-
shaped functions ( UF ) defined as complementarities of 
π -shaped functions, as Figure 1 shows. In Figure 1, 
we assume that a b c≤ ≤ . It is straightforward to prove 
that when a b c= = , SF  and ZF  both have only two 
values which are 0 and 1, while Fπ  only has 0 and UF  
only has 1 as their values. By adjusting the values of a, 
b and c, the shapes of Fπ  and UF  can be changed. 
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Figure 1. The curves of the membership 
functions 
A set P  containing n  observations 1, , nX X…  of a 
metric for a random variable X , i.e. { ,2,| 1 }nP X n== … , 
can be obtained. In P, there must be a minimum minX  
and a maximum maxX . The mean of all the elements in 
P  is avg  as (1) defines. It is defined that 
[ ]min maxCI = X ,X . Thus, by assigning minX , avg  and 
maxX  to the parameters of membership functions a, b 
and c, respectively, any observation of a metric for a 
random variable X  can be mapped to a real number in 
[ ]0,1 . This real number denotes the dubiety degree of 
an observation nX . The values of minX , avg  and maxX  
can be obtained by existing approaches. Because minX  
and maxX are both in CI, ( ) 1minXF <  and ( ) 1maxXF <  
must stand (meaning minX  and maxX  do not cause 
anomaly), where { , , , }Z S UF F F F Fπ∈ . As a result, we 
have the definition of the four types of membership 
functions shown in Figure 2. The parameter α  can be 
assigned a proper value by users according to the 
applications. Nevertheless, it is recommended that α  
is not less than 1 too much to keep the result values in 
( , ]b c  differentiable. 
 
4. Architecture based on DDM 
 
The architecture for database transaction monitoring 
based on DDM is designed as shown in Figure 3. 
The user interface (UI) provides tools for 
interactions, which includes Setting Rules and display 
Dubiety-Determining Results. Setting Rules allows 
users to set up monitoring policies. These monitoring 
policies are then formatted and transferred into 
Detection Rules Base by Mapping to Rules. The 
information about each database transaction is 
organized into Audits Base by Sensor. Event Analyzing 
selects every new audit record from Audits Base, and 
then checks against the detection rules in Detection 
Rules Base. Finally, Event Analyzing calculates 
dubiety degree for the audit record, and forwards the 
results to Dubiety-Determining Result. 
Other main components of the architecture are: 
Audits Base is built to store the audit records 
generated by Sensor, while Detection Rules Base is 
used to store detection rules defined manually. 
Setting Rules, used to define detection rules, specifies 
which attributes of transactions to monitor, what types 
of membership functions to use, and what the values of 
the parameters in membership functions are, etc. 
Mapping to Rules. When the information of the 
monitoring policy and membership function is decided, 
Mapping to Rules translates it into the format of 
detection rules to store in Detection Rules Base. 
Sensor. This module monitors the transactions of 
application databases in real time. By analyzing each 
transaction processed, it collects information about the 
transaction, and then stores it in Audits Base. 
Event Analyzing. This is the centre of the whole 
architecture. The monitoring algorithm is implemented 
in this module. For each record in Audits Base, Event 
Analyzing Module is processed and matched against 
the rules in Rules Base. The value of the monitored 
attribute is then obtained. By substituting this value in 
the membership function defined in the rule, the result 
of the function is calculated as the degree of dubiety. 
There are two basic data structures required in DDM: 
Audit Record and Detection Rule. Audit Record is for 
recording the information about each database 
transaction. Detection Rule is the structure for 
specifying the format of the detection rules. The details 
of the two structures are defined as follows. 
Audit Record. This data structure is 6-tuple 
recording information of each database transaction: 
<AID, UID, SQLText, Time_stampe, Data1, Data2> 
where 
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Figure 2. The definitions of the membership 
functions 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The architecture for database 
transaction monitoring based on DDM 
 
 
z AID is the identifier for each audit record. 
z UID records the user name of the transaction. 
z SQLText records the content of the SQL 
statement of the transaction. 
z Time_stamp records the time when the 
transaction is executed. 
z Data1 is the first data field that the transaction 
relates to. For example, the data value before 
update. 
z Data2 is the second data field that the 
transaction relates to. For example, the data 
value after an update. 
To make it clearer, from now on in this paper, we will 
use the term audit record instead of transaction. 
Detection Rule. This data structure is 6-tuple 
defining the format of the detection rules: 
<RID, UID, Action, Obj1, Obj2, Condition, 
Time_window, Mon_type, Function, Enable> 
where 
z RID starting with the letter R is the identifier for 
each detection rule. 
z UID indicates which user the rule is aimed at. 
z Action indicates what type of operations the rule 
is related to, such as select, update, delete and 
so on. 
z Obj1 and Obj2 records for which database 
object (table, view, procedure, and so on) the 
rule is valid. Obj1 is the first object that Action 
refers to, such as a table, a view or a procedure. 
Obj2 is the second one. If Obj1 is a table or a 
view, Obj2 will be a field name. 
z Condition indicates the condition of Action. 
Usually it is the condition part (where clause) of 
the SQL statement. 
z Time_window specifies a number of hours as a 
time range. The audit records occurred in that 
time range before the currently being checked 
one will be sought by the rule. 
z Mon_type is the type of monitor. It has two 
values: C and S. C is used for counting numbers 
and S is for recording the sum value.  
Function is sub-tuple recording the information of 
the membership function used by the rule: 
<FID, A, B, C> 
where 
 FID specifies which type of membership 
function to use. It has four values. ‘Z’ means 
ZF . ‘S’ means SF . ‘P’ means Fπ , while 
‘U’ means UF . 
 A, B, and C store the values of a, b, and c 
respectively (definition of membership 
function). 
 Enable is a switch. When it is 1, the rule is valid; 
otherwise, it is not. 
 
5. Experimental results 
 
The experiments are performed on the DBMS of 
Microsoft SQL Server 2000 on Microsoft Windows 
Server 2003 SP1, to show whether DDM can discover 
Cumulated Anomaly behaviors. The example database 
Northwind of SQL Server is used in this study. The 
table Products in it stores product-related data, 
including ProductID and UnitPrice. Suppose there is a 
product whose ProductID is 9 in Products. Assume a 
member of staff, Ann, is authorized to modify 
UnitPrice of Product 9. However, if the UnitPrice has 
been changed too much or too often, it could be 
suspicious. It is defined that UnitPrice should not be 
changed for more than 4 times in 30 days, and the sum 
of changed value should not be more than 3 pounds in 
90 days. Audits Base and Detection Rules Base are 
built according to the two basic structures defined. 
Data. 30000 normal audit records are stored in the 
database. Their schema is described in Section 4. They 
include Time_stamps (system clock) in a period of 
three months. The values of fields SQLText are 
common database operations in the form of SQL 
statements, including selecting data from a table, 
updating the data in a table, inserting data into or 
deleting data from a table, executing a procedure, and 
opening a database. Referring to the above 
assumptions, 12 additional audit records for Ann’s 
updating UnitPrice of Products 9 are constructed and 
mixed into the existing 30000 audit records. These 12 
records are distributed into the range of three months. 
The Detection Rules Base (described in Section 4) 
contains two typical detection rules listed in Table 1 
(in which the column of Enable is not listed to make 
the table not too wide). For example, R02 is used to 
monitor the audit records with Ann as UID, update 
[Products] set UnitPrice=p where ProductID=9 as 
SQLText (where p is a number). The data items before 
and after update operation are recorded in the fields 
Data1 and Data2. When an audit record R  which 
meets the demand of R02 occurs, the algorithm seeks 
the audit records meeting the demand of R02 which 
have occurred 2160 hours before R , and sums up the 
margins between each pair of Data1 and Data2 in each 
of them. Then, the summation is substituted into UF  
defined in R02. Finally, a result value of the function is 
calculated as the dubiety degree of that audit record. 
As this is a real-time process; an audit record will be 
examined as soon as it arrives.  
 
Table 1. The two detection rules 
RID UID ACTION Obj1 Obj2 CONDITION TIME_WINDOW MON_TYPE FID A B C
R01 Ann update Products UnitPrice ProductID=9 720 C S 0 3 5
R02 Ann update Products UnitPrice ProductID=9 2160 S U -3.0 0 3
 
It can be seen from Table 1 that the two rules are 
both designed to monitor Ann’s operations of updating 
UnitPrice of Products 9. R01 monitors the number of 
occurrences of the operation over 30 days (720 hours), 
while R02 monitors the accumulated values modified 
over 90 days (2160 hours). 
Results. In this experiment, we let 0.9α = . As a 
result, ( ) ( ) 0.95S max SF X F c= = . The experiment 
contains three tests. In Test 1 only R01 is enabled. In 
Test 2 only R02 is enabled. Both R01 and R02 are 
enabled in Test 3 to show the combined results. Figure 
4 shows all results. Figure 4 (a) shows the value of 
UnitPrice after Ann updates it for each time. Figure 4 
(b) shows the monitor result of using the rule of R01. 
We can see that the dubiety degree is increasing 
gradually.  However, it does not reach 1 all the while. 
That means no anomaly occurs by R01. Figure 4 (c) 
shows the results of monitoring the modified UnitPrice 
of Product 9 over 90 days by R02. It is shown that the 
dubiety degree is more and more close to 1. At the end 
the dubiety degree reaches 1. According to the 
definition of DDM, anomalies may occur. When R01 
and R02 are both enabled in Test 3, the results are 
shown in Figure 4 (d). Figure 4 (d) also can be 
regarded as the combinations of Figure 4 (b) and 
Figure 4 (c) by selecting the point with the higher 
dubiety degree value between (b) and (c) for each AID. 
In general, when several detection rules are matched to 
the same audit record, the highest value of dubiety 
degree amongst these rules will be selected. From the 
results, we can see Ann’s operations cause anomaly. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
A new type of database anomaly Cumulated 
Anomaly is investigated. A new detection method 
Dubiety-Determining Model (DDM) has been proposed 
for it. Based on DDM, architecture for database 
transaction monitoring is designed and implemented. 
Tests have been performed to verify the 
effectiveness of our novel method. The results suggest 
that our methods are capable of identifying suspicious 
user behaviors. We are currently considering 
developing a method based on DDM for general 
anomaly detection in databases. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. The result of the experiment 
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